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I. THE FARM POLICY PROBLEM 
A. Introduction 
A major socio-economic problem has confronted American 
agriculture for more than three decades and is still high on 
the agenda of national affairs. Large public investments have 
been and are made in continuous efforts to solve the problem, 
or at least to reduce some of its consequences, such as low 
farm income. Most of these efforts materialized in the form 
of ad-hoc programs, related to the immediate future, rather 
than to long range solutions. 
The evaluation of these programs in terms of their 
quantitative effects, falls without the scope of this study. 
One thing is, however, clear: none of the heretofore tried 
programs have suceeded in bringing about a situation satis­
factory to most groups concerned with agriculture. 
In its broadest sense, the farm policy problem belongs, 
of course, to the problem of social choice. Our objective in 
this study is twofold: first, the farm problem is examined 
by using some theoretical tools provided by welfare economics, 
an examination which already serves to clarify some of the 
basic issues involved. This examination points to some 
possibilities of aiding the process of social choice, making 
it more systematic and explicit. Secondly, we develop the 
tools that may serve in carrying out the choice process in 
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the manner indicated in the first stage. 
The major question that has to be answered before any 
attempt at formulating farm programs is made, is what 
precisely does one mean by the Farm Problem? In general, a 
practical economic "problem" can be defined only relative to 
some desired state of affairs. Thus, for instance, a given 
employment situation will be regarded as problematic if the 
level of unemployment is higher than some specified level 
which is viewed as desired; a foreign trade situation will 
present a problem if the gap in the trade balance exceeds some 
maximal acceptable gap. Other examples may be found with 
respect to savings habits, wage rates etc. What then is the 
desired state of affairs to which the current situation in 
American agriculture is compared, and what is the problem 
observed on the basis of this comparison? 
A recent definition of the problem is provided in a 
report of the National Agricultural Advisory Commission (1), 
hereafter referred to as the USDA report. Six policy goals 
are outlined (pp. 10-12) in this report. Two of these seem 
to imply the core of the problem. In the sequence in which 
they are mentioned, they are: 
2. A level of farm income enabling efficient producers 
to earn returns on their labor and investment 
comparable with returns realized on similar resources 
outside of agriculture. 
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3. ... maximum freedom for individual farm operators 
within the limit of farm programs. 
The first, profits which are too low for the efficient"*" 
farmer, is defined in comparison with profits that could be 
earned outside of agriculture. The observation is thus made 
that the productivity of at least part of the resources in 
agriculture is lower than their alternative costs. The 
second point concerns the degree of public intervention in 
f 
the agricultural sector. 
Accepting this definition of the problem, it is clear 
that what is sought is some lower bound on farm income and 
higher bound to public involvement. That is, while farm 
income is desired to exceed a certain level, public inter­
vention should be kept under a certain level. Suppose now 
that one may define the set P of all levels of farm profits 
p such that p > p, where p is the lower bound. In order to 
achieve any p of P, some level of public intervention g may 
be needed. We form the set G of all such levels g. Next, we 
define the set S of all levels of public involvement s such 
that s < s where s is the upper bound. Then one difficulty 
which may arise is GO S = 0, where 0 denotes the empty set. 
That is, none of the levels of public involvement which is 
—The term "efficient farmer" is not well defined. The 
definition rests primarily on the rate of profits presently 
earned, and hence involves some circularity. 
if 
acceptable, is sufficient to bring about an acceptable level 
of farm income. In that case, the policy goals are incon­
sistent or unattainable. 
Suppose now that no such inconsistency exists i.e., 
Gn S / 0. We assume also that P and S are ordered by magni­
tude i.e., for every two points p1 and p" in P, p' is 
preferred to p" if, and only if, p' > p". Similarly, for 
every two points Sq and. s in S, sQ is preferred to s if, and 
only if, s < s. Three possibilities now evolve. First is 
the case where GAS is a single point, say gQ. Then the 
"policymaker" is faced with no problem of choice. Only one 
acceptable state, (pQ, gQ), is attainable. For the other 
two cases, suppose that GO S = G1 and that the corresponding 
subset of P is P1, where G' and P1 contain each more than one 
point. The second case is now characterized by the existence 
of a pair g^ G' and pQe P1 such that g0 < g1 for all g'éG' 
and pQ > p' for all p'eP1. That is, out of all acceptable 
states there is. one which is best. As in the first case, 
no further choice is necessary. The only decision is made 
when P and S are defined. 
It is the third situation which is most likely to occur 
and in which we are interested namely, when there is no best 
alternative. That is, for any two pairs (p1, g') and (p", g") 
of P1 and G', whenever p' > p", g1 > g" and whenever g1 < g", 
p' <p". Then one is confronted with a range of alternatives 
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for which we did not establish an ordering criterion, yet 
from which a choice must be made. That is, a ranking of the 
alternatives is now required if a "rational" decision is 
desired. 
The problem of ranking the alternatives involves a lot 
more than just ordering the elements of P'xG' by some 
preference criterion which depends on P! and G1 only. The 
choice of any particular pair (p, g) may have far reaching 
ramifications in terms of the number of farmers in business, 
the farm size, volume of output, prices of agricultural 
products etc. All these must be taken into consideration, 
since in practice they do influence decisions. 
It is our task in this chapter to suggest a systematic 
way of going about the problem of choice. The terminology 
employed is the one provided by welfare economics. 
B. The Problem of Choice_ 
For the purpose of the ensuing discussion, we conceive 
of a social welfare function as consisting of two distinguish­
able parts: (a) the Bergson (2) economic welfare function; 
(b) a part which we lable the non-economic component of the 
social welfare function. This second part contains variables 
other than quantities of commodities and services consumed or 
delivered by individuals in the economy. It will contain 
variables representing society's institutional and ethical 
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preferences, such as education, the beauty of the neighbor's 
lawn, space research, the form of municipal government etc. 
The construction of such a welfare function consists of 
determining which variables affect social welfare, by how 
much and in what direction. This is equivalent to the 
knowledge of the first partial derivatives of the social 
welfare function with respect to all variables. We shall 
refer to these partial derivatives as weights; in the case 
of a linear function, they will be constants. 
Having outlined the general structure of the social 
welfare function, we must now concern ourselves with some 
specific variables pertinent to the analysis. As is well 
known, any attempt at dealing with the detailed structure of 
a welfare function involves value judgments. As a first 
step, we shall suppose that the following value loaded 
specifications are arrived at by general consent. As will 
be seen, these initial value judgments can be termed 
"minimal", at least as far as Western Democracies are con­
cerned. First, we stipulate that the Bergson part of the 
function contains the utilities of farmers with positive 
weights. This means, that a ceteris paribus rise in farm 
income, increases social welfare. Secondly, we include in 
the second part of the social welfare function the following 
four variables with non-zero weights; (a) an income distri­
bution variable which for our case will be taken to be the 
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ratio of farm to non-farm income; Co) a variable representing 
the degree to which the farm sector is planned by the 
government, called the central planning variable and carrying 
a negative weight; (c) a variable representing public 
involvement in the form of price support, subsidies and the 
purchase of surpluses called the public* intervention variable; 
(d) a variable representing public support to agricultural 
research and education. We assume that the last two variables 
are adequately represented in terms of public funds expended 
in the process of implementing the various schemes. 
It will be easy to see now, that the above specifica­
tions are not sufficient as grounds for choice. One still 
must determine at the very least the relative weights of 
variables (a), (c) and (d). For if we consider the USDA 
report again, it seems that the weight it attaches to the 
public intervention variable is negative, but relatively 
small compared to the positive one it attaches to the income 
p 
distribution variable . But it is very easy to imagine an 
attitude reversing this relationship. It will be illustrative 
to picture the first attitude as resulting in a directive to 
the economist, asking him to find a program which minimizes 
public involvement subject to a minimum level of farm income, 
while viewing the second attitude as resulting in an effort 
-^ The report does not seem to be concerned about variable 
(d) at all. 
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to maximize farm income subject to a ceiling on public 
intervention. Only an extraordinary coincidence would lead 
to identical programs in both cases. 
It is thus clear, that the major problem we now confront 
is that for further specifications we cannot reasonably claim 
unanimity. This means, that we face at this point the Arrow 
(3) problem of constructing a welfare function. This is not, 
however, the purpose of our deliberation. Rather, we are -
interested here in a concrete problem which is faced in 
everyday practice. Facing the problem in everyday life is 
made possible, since some sort of a social welfare function 
is being used, or else no government would function. We 
shall therefore take the existing social welfare function, 
whatever it is, for granted and concentrate on the problem of 
its utilization in the process of choice. 
Ideally, having accepted a social welfare function, we 
can simply maximize it over the possible alternatives, 
thereby identifying the optimal policy. Practically, there 
doesn't seem to be so far a reasonable way of doing it. 
Fir-st, there is no satisfactory way of obtaining an estimate 
to the welfare function. Even though some methods of measure­
ment have been suggested, notably that by Frisch 0+), their 
theoretical soundness and practical applicability are 
questionable. Finding the welfare maximizer by trial and 
error, even though possible, seems to have yielded up until 
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now very little results, as evidenced by the continuous 
disenchantment with the farm situation. 
The rest of the chapter is devoted to suggesting a method 
of choosing optimal policies by systematizing the trial-and-
error procedure. The method is based on some fundamental 
results of economic theory. 
C. The Economist's Contribution 
The method which is suggested to overcome the encountered 
difficulties is based on explicit comparisons of various 
alternatives, the outcome of each of which can be computed if 
certain assumptions are met. We shall first indicate the 
theoretical foundations for the method. The next chapter 
establishes tools for carrying it out in practice. We shall 
see that in the course of developing the argument, consider­
able insight into the farm problem can already be gained. 
For those parts of the analysis which warrant mathemati-. 
cal statements, the following notation is adopted: the k-
dimensional linear space is denoted by E%; points (vectors) 
in E'k are denoted by lower case letters; if x' and x" are two 
s u c h  p o i n t s  i n  E ^ ,  t h e n  x '  ^  x "  m e a n s  x |  >  x £  f o r  i  =  1 , 2 , . . . ,  
k, where i is the coordinate index; x' > x" means x' ^  x" 
with x| > xV for at least one i. Capital letters denote 
sets, and superscripts are used to discriminate vectors or 
sets. 
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We consider an economy with n desired (consumer) and m 
primary (non-producible) commodities. For simplicity, we 
omit intermediate commodities. Incorporating such goods 
would not alter the discussion in any significant way. The 
commodity space is thus given by En+ . In that space, we 
define the set X1 to be the set of consumption choices of the 
i-th consumer and the set Y^  of all possible production 
choices of the j-th producer. The set X^  is characterized as 
follows: every point xX€ X1 is a list of quantities consumed 
of n + 1 commodities, the n + ls1: being leisure. We must 
"î N. have x & 0 which means, that X1 is confined to the non-
negative orthant of En+m. As for Y^ , any point yd of Y3 is a 
list of outputs, with positive signs, and inputs, with 
negative signs. We define the aggregate consumption and 
production sets by X = 2X1 and Y = 2Y^ *, respectively. We 
i J 
further define the set Z = X rt Y as the attainable set, and 
assume it is convex (non-increasing returns). 
Starting now with the concept of saturation, we postu­
late the existence of a complete preference preordering on 
X^ - for all i. That is, a preference relation which is 
reflexive, connected and transitive. The individual complete 
preorderings give rise to an aggregate preference preordering 
(reflexive and transitive) on X. We will say that for xf and 
x" in X, x1 is preferred to x" if no consumer i prefers x^ " 
to x^ ' and at least one consumer k prefers x^ ' to x^ ". 
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Let now x be a point in X and consider the set of all 
points x' in X such that 
xk > xk for some k (1.1) 
and x5-' = x5- for all i ^  k (1.2) 
Then if x is preferred to x', x is a saturation point. We 
shall assume that no such x exists in Z. Whenever x and 
x1 are two points of Z satisfying (1.1) and (1.2), we 
assume that xl is preferred to x. We shall also assume that 
a movement from x to x' will not involve redistribution 
among the consumers of x, so that (1.1) and (1.2) are always 
satisfied and hence x' always preferred to x. "More" is 
always preferred to "less". 
Turning now to the concept of efficiency, let y° be a 
point in Z. Then we say that y° is efficient if there is 
no y^  in Z such that y^  > y°. This means, that if we cannot 
produce more of at least one commodity without reducing the 
output of another commodity, or cannot produce the same 
bundle by reducing at least one input without increasing the 
rate of another input, production is efficient. Viewing 
primary commodities as not desired themselves, we can simply 
state that any point on the production possibility frontier, 
is efficient. 
Based on the assumptions made, it becomes now at once 
clear that the Bergson function, if based on the preference 
ordering s on X1, cannot reach its maximum at a non-efficient 
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point. This is not, however, the only significance of 
efficient points. We have assumed above, that the social 
welfare function contains a variable whose weight reflects 
resentment of the introduction of central planning of the 
kind existing in Communist economies. That is, we assume 
that the American society much prefers an economy in which 
the (profit motivated) producers compete, to an economy in 
which they are told by a central authority what and how much 
to produce. As has been shown (5, pp. 87, 102),"^  production 
under competition is always efficient, regardless of how 
prices are formed. That is, non-efficiency will always 
indicate, to one degree or another, the lack of competition, 
and hence non-efficiency is not desirable from this stand­
point as well. 
I do not intend to infer from the two preceding findings, 
that it is impossible that the social welfare function 
reaches a maximum at a non-efficient point. Desires such as 
attaining a certain degree of self sufficiency and keeping a 
minimum percentage of the population in farming, may outweight 
the desirability for economic satisfaction and competition. 
But it seems equally likely, that the subset of efficient 
points is closer to the maximizer of the social welfare 
function ("closer" in terms of the value of the function) 
3 
—The non-mathematically inclined reader is referred to 
an excellent discussion in Essay I of Koopmans (6). 
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than any other subset of points which could be specified on 
a priori grounds. The last is, of course, a value loaded 
postulate, expressing some belief concerning human behavior. 
It is this postulate which constitutes the logical basis for 
the decision making process to be introduced. For if the 
postulate is valid, it offers an important criterion that can 
be used to narrow the field from which final choice is to be 
made. We may think of the maximum value of the Bergson 
function as a numeraire, used to "price" goals whose realiza­
tion requires non-efficiency. In linear production economies, 
this is a practically feasible procedure, since in such 
economies every efficient point can be computed by solving a 
linear programming problem (7, p. 88). Once this is done, 
goals that call for inefficiency, i.e. for a reduction in the 
value of the Bergson function and the introduction of central 
planning, can be judged by the amount of sacrifice' in 
inefficiency and planning. 
This is not enough. We still need some criterion for 
comparing efficient points to one another. This additional 
criterion is provided by the public intervention variable. 
Its role in this phase of the procedure is equivalent to the 
role played by the Bergson and central planning variables in 
the former phase. This will be facilitated by postulating, 
that the public intervention variable carries a negative 
weight. We would thus have some special interest at the 
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point at which the value of the public intervention variable 
vanishes. 
The point which is singled out is, of course, the point 
of market equilibrium. This is the point which will be 
(at least theoretically) realized, when not only central 
planning is absent but also prices are formed by Tâtonnement, 
or what can be termed as the dollar-voting mechanism. That 
is, this is the efficient point which will be reached when no 
form of public intervention is present. It is therefore the 
point, where farm income is maximum when no market regula­
tions are imposed. 
We saw before, that we cannot be sure that efficiency is 
really desired, even though the case for efficiency was quite 
strong. The case for market equilibrium is considerably 
weaker but, as before, the mere knowledge of the point of 
market equilibrium, provides a criterion for an explicit 
elimination process, which may be beneficial. For it will be 
possible to see to what extent market freedom must be 
dispensed with and at what costs, in order to bring about 
what is essentially a change in income distribution. That 
is, we are again in a position to "price" alternatives. 
As for the practicability of this phase, it is again 
true that linear programming may be used to carry it out. 
We shall examine this possibility towards the end of the 
next section, whose first part is devoted to a reconsideration 
of the farm problem, in the light of the preceding discussion 
and some of the major studies accomplished in this field 
heretofore. It will be the major purpose of Chapter II to 
develop more efficient tools for the process of comparisons 
in the efficient subset. 
D. The Farm Problem Reconsidered 
To facilitate the discussion from this section on, the 
following notâtional convention is adopted: lower case 
letters denote, as before, column vectors; prime denotes 
transposition, but will be used only when not absolutely 
clear from the context; capital letters denote matrices or, 
when so indicated, sets; superscripts are used as before. 
The only empirical studies which, to my knowledge, 
attempted a major breakthrough along the lines of the above 
argument, are those by Heady and Egbert (8), Skold (9), 
"Whittlesey (10) and Brokken (11). All of these studies 
applied a multi-regional formulation of a particular linear 
programming model to the field crops (feed grains, soybeans 
and cotton) and livestock (cattle and hogs) industries. The 
model used is the following: let there be K regions. Let 
xk represent the output vector in region k (k = 1,2,... ,K), 
ck be the unit cost vector associated with xk, A^  be the 
k technology matrix, b the resource constraint vector and d 
be a vector of demanded quantities. Then the general 
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formulation of the model is: 
to minimize 2 c^ x^  
k 
sub j ect to A^ x^  S "bk k = 1,... ,£ 
2 x151 > d 
k 
> 0 
The objective in applying the model was to find the most 
efficient regional allocation of production for an array of 
final demands d. As stated, this is a limited practical 
objective, but we shall see that it falls in line with the 
above general procedure. First, note that the solution 
presents the result of competition among producers (regions). 
Once d is specified, competition among farmers would have led 
to the results obtained in solving the above problem, provided 
the farm sector meets the basic assumptions underlying linear 
production sectors. Secondly, and this is the chief feature 
of interest to us here, the solution to the above problem, 
s 
as we shall see below, is probably not efficient. It may be 
worthwhile to say that this statement is not intended as a 
criticism, but rather as an important indication as to what 
we can learn from such a solution, in terms of the policy it 
represents. 
Having indicated the merits of a regional formulât ion, 
it will be instructive to consider the above problem in an 
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aggregative fashion. Theoretically, such an aggregation 
is possible, and we therefore let the triple (c, A, b) 
represent the aggregation over k of (ck, Ak, bk). The 
problem then becomes 
to minimize f(x) = cx (1.3) 
subject to Ax 1 b (1.4) 
x = d (1.5) 
x = 0 (1.6) 
Let us define the following (convex) sets: = 
{x: Ax ^  b, x ^  o j  and X2 z [x: x ^  dj . Then our 
programming problem is to minimize f(x) over X = X^ rt X2. 
Fig. 1 portrays the sets X1, X2 and X for a two-dimensional 
example case. The set X3" is given by the bounded plane OABC, 
2 X is given by the unbounded shaded area and X by EDF. That 
is, only points of the closed bounded set EDF satisfy all the 
constraints. The enumerated parallel lines represent some of 
the "contours" of f(x), and the broken line is the normal 
to these lines through the origin, whose length can be shown 
to be proportional to the value of f(x). Obviously, the 
solution to the problem represented by Fig. 1 is not effi­
cient; it will be at the point E. If it were to be efficient, 
the point E would have to lie on the efficiency frontier ABC, 
as shown in Fig. 2. The likelihood of a situation like the 
one represented by Fig. 1 is, of course, much greater than 
the one represented by Fig. 2, and hence we safely conclude 
18 
Fig. 2. Efficient solution 
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that the solutions in the above studies are not efficient. 
Yet there is little doubt that they constitute an improvement 
over the present state of affairs in the farm sector, at 
least as far as farm income and surpluses are concerned. It 
should be noted that, being non-efficient, practical implemen­
tation of such solutions would call for some degree of central 
planning. Still, the resulting pattern is considered superior 
to the present one. Why is this result important, and in 
what way does it serve us in the search for a systematic 
formulation of farm policy? 
Returning to the present structure of the farm sector, 
it is obvious that, under current conditions, efficiency in 
the farm sector would, indeed, be disastrous for the farmer. 
Actually, the Land Retirement Program which is, to be sure, 
a relatively mild form of central planning, is aimed at 
preventing efficiency. The emphasis here is on "under 
current conditions". By this is meant chiefly the amount of 
primary resources presently committed to agriculture, or the 
vector b. The outstanding point concerning b is, that it 
probably is not a part of a price guided allocation pattern, 
neither in reality nor in the above studies. All that has 
been said above about efficient points and their characteris­
tics, relates to efficient points when the economy as a whole 
is considered. These characteristics do not necessarily 
hold for an isolated sector, unless h belongs to a price 
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guided allocation, and hence an efficient point, to begin 
with. "When it does not, then profits will be, in general, 
no longer maximal at an efficient point of the isolated 
sector's possibility set. 
It is thus clear, that the present farm policy is based 
not only on the variables that were explicitly included in 
the welfare function, but also on some of the variables 
mentioned in the previous section, such as the percentage of 
the population on farms, the cultural value of farm life etc. 
We have a situation in which the amount of resources, particu­
larly labor, committed to farming is not just a means to 
production but an end in itself. Realizing this end necessi­
tates foregoing efficiency and the introduction of public 
intervention of the forms specified. The solutions in the 
above studies indicate how the pursued policy can be achieved 
most efficiently in the sense that they minimize the "Bergson 
sacrifice" which must be made. 
This takes us right back to the argument of the previous 
section. For the question to be asked now is, whether or not 
the present policy, when implemented in the fashion prescribed 
by the above studies, is optimal. Is the desire to prevent 
reallocation of resources i.e. migration from the farms, 
really "worth" the sacrifice in efficiency (hence central 
planning) and other forms of public intervention? If the 
desire to keep farm population in tact is not the motive, 
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can this sacrifice be defended on other grounds? It seems, 
that the only other reason for keeping the present level of 
resources comitted to agriculture would be, that the degree 
of public intervention required in order to facilitate a 
transfer of labor force from the farm sector to other 
sectors, is considerably higher than the degree presently 
existing or the degree that is called for in conjunction with 
the above studies. No evidence for such reasoning exists. 
Moreover, I believe that the contrary is more likely. That 
is, in the long run, such shifting of resources would involve 
less public intervention. 
The lesson is very clear: if the reluctance to engage 
in resource reallocation (because, say, of the values attached 
to cultural and other aspects of life on farms, the fear of 
over-urbanization, etc.) really outweighs all the other 
considerations, then the farm problem is not one of basic 
policy formulation, but rather a technical problem of how to 
best implement the existing policy. If it is the latter, the 
solution is given by the above studies. 
It seems, however, that the farm problem is a more basic 
one. The USDA report is one indication of that. It is also 
well known that at least one of the most important farm 
organizations, namely the Farm Bureau, is diametrically 
opposed to most basics of the present farm policy. We shall 
thus assume that policy changes are needed. 
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As indicated in the concluding remarks of the last 
section, we proceed now to demonstrate how the above linear 
model can be utilized in carrying out the explicit decision 
making process. Such a demonstration seems worthwhile for 
history's sake as well as to further show how the applications 
initiated by Professor Heady are in line with the main stream 
of the present analysis. It will also aid in the under­
standing of the procedure. 
Suppose, now, that the above model, in its regional or 
non-regional form, is applied to the economy as a whole. 
Further, suppose that the demand system for consumer goods is 
given by 
d = d(p) (1.7) 
where p is the price vector, listing the prices of all final 
commodities. The process we shall carry out is as follows: 
first, the point of market equilibrium will be sought. After 
it is found, the decision must be made whether or not it is 
desirable. If, because of income distribution or other 
considerations it is not, other efficient points can be 
examined by, say, artificially fixing higher prices for farm 
products, with the understanding that the government will 
purchase surpluses. If no efficient point is satisfactory 
(because, say, farm population is too small or farm surpluses 
do not meet the needs of the Foreign Aid Plans), non-efficient 
points may be considered. 
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We thus start with finding the market solution. If we 
knew p°, the market equilibrium price, we could simply com­
pute d° = d(p°) and insert d° in (1.5). Such knowledge is 
not usually available, and hence p° must be identified. To 
see how this can be done, consider the dual to our pro­
gramming problem, 
to maximize g(u,w) = bu - dw (1.8) 
subject to A'u - w = c (1.9) 
u,w I 0 
where u and w are the (vectors of) "shadow prices" of the 
resources in b and the commodities in d, respectively. It 
can be easily shown, that if (u°, w°) solves the dual problem 
such that w° = p°, then d = d°. The process under which such 
a solution is found is as follows: we select an initial 
price vector, say p1, and solve for d1 from (1.7). d^  is 
then inserted in (1.8) and the dual problem is solved (given 
that a solution exists when d = d^ ). We get a solution, say 
(u1, w1). If w^ " i- p\ we compute 
d2 = d(w^ ), 
insert d2 in (1.8) and solve for aw2. We continue in this 
fashion until, for some t, wt+^ " = w^ . When this happens, 
w^  = p° and d* = d°. The method has, indeed, been used by 
Schrader and King (12). 
Clearly, the described method is cumbersome, and would 
2k 
be infeasible for large scale problems, because of both 
computing limitations and budget constraints. However, at 
this stage we are satisfied with the principal results and 
if 
may brush aside technical difficulties 
Efficient points other than market equilibrium may have 
been already obtained during the above iterative procedure. 
The verification is easy, since any solution such that 
u > 0 is efficient. However, to systematically trace out 
other efficient points, one would use the following problem: 
to maximize (p - c)x 
subject to Ax = b 
x £ 0 
where p now represents the (government) determined prices. 
If p is chosen, say, as p* such that p* > p°, and x^  solves 
the problem, the public expenditures will be given by 
Pt(xt - d^ ) 
where d^  = d(p^ ) 
If none of the efficient solutions is satisfactory, 
non-efficient alternatives may be sought in two main direc­
tions. First, resources may be shifted from the non-farm 
to the farm, sector (if the motive is farm population or the 
level of production). Secondly, additional restrictions may 
be imposed. For instance, if return to farm resources is 
If 
—Also, there is no proof that the iterative procedure 
described converges, but we shall neglect that as well. 
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deemed insufficient, restrictions on the relevant shadow 
prices may be imposed. For each new solution, the "sacrifice" 
in efficiency and public involvement can be computed. These 
are some of the courses that can be followed in quantifying 
and evaluating the results of as many policies as one wishes 
to consider. It should be noted that the variable repre­
senting public support to agricultural research and education 
can also be introduced into the process. One may represent 
the impact of such activities by changing A and resolving the 
array of problems. The new solutions can now be used to 
determine the "welfare value" of the public expenditures 
incurred in changing A. 
Naturally, the choice of the particular policy to be 
followed, is not the function of the economist, at least not 
in his capacity as a "professional". This choice is to be 
made according to the rules by which the social welfare 
function is constructed. In the U.S. and other democracies, 
the choice is based on the relative majority rule. 
What the economist can do,' and this is, so I hope, what 
was accomplished in this chapter, is to improve the methodology 
of going about the process of choice. He can also contribute 
by supplying some operational tools, one of which was already 
discussed, more to be developed in the following chapter. 
Admittedly, the tools economics has to offer are far from 
being perfect. They are limited by assumptions part of which 
26 
are known to be unrealistic, the credibility of others cannot 
yet be verified. However, within the limits of supporting 
tools, such as statistics, the techniques offered by the 
economist, so I believe, are liable to yield better results 
as compared with those obtained by some of the presently 
practiced procedures. I therefore believe, that if there is 
at all a chance of finding a modus vivendi with regard to 
American agriculture, the prescribed method must be employed. 
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II. MATHEMATICAL MODELS 
A. Objectives 
Before getting to the subject matter, a few more nota-
tional remarks are in order. Elements of matrices will be 
represented by the corresponding superscripted lower case 
letters if they are vectors, or by the corresponding sub­
scripted lower case letters if they are scalars. Superscripts 
are generally used to discriminate matrices. 2> denotes the 
gradiant operation. In particular, the following symbols will 
be kept throughout the chapter, unless otherwise specified, 
x = an n-vector of outputs; 
p = an n-vector of prices of the elements of x; 
b = an m-vector of given amounts of restricted resources; 
A = the m x n technology matrix relating x to b; 
u = the m-vector of imputed prices of the limited 
resources; 
c = the n-vector of pecuniary outlays, associated with 
the production of a unit of x. 
As indicated at the conclusion of Chapter I, our prime 
objective in this chapter is to develop tools which will 
enable us to carry out the process of choice outlined above. 
In order that such tools be effective, they must enable us 
1.' To compute efficient points in general, and that 
efficient point which is associated with market equilibrium 
in particular. 
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2. To estimate the "sacrifices" associated with the 
various efficient or non-efficient alternatives. It is the 
first point which constitutes most of the burden since it 
must be proved, for any given model, that it is suitable for 
solving for a competitive equilibrium. That is, assuming 
non-saturation, we must show that a solution can be found which 
a. Is efficient. 
b. Guarantees maximum gross and netr1 profits for"the 
sector, as well as for each firm in the sector. 
c. Guarantees non-positive net profits for any firm in 
any activity. 
d. Would be brought about by a free market which 
generates prices so as to equate supply and demand. 
In the previous chapter, we saw already how linear 
programming may be utilized in obtaining competitive solutions. 
Some more elaboration in this direction will prove helpful 
in the development of quadratic programming models designed 
for the same purpose. 
Consider, then, the linear programming Problem 1 
to maximize f(x) = (p - c)x (2.1) 
subject to Ax S b (2.2) 
x > 0 (2.3) 
where p and c are given, and where A and c are supposed to 
—Net profits are obtained after returns to fixed 
resources are subtracted from gross profits. 
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be representative of the sector as a whole. Will the solu­
tion to Problem 1 satisfy our conditions? We shall examine 
this with respect to each of them and, in doing so, base 
ourselves on some fundamental theorems in point set theory 
and linear programming. 
With regard to efficiency, let X = {xj be a closed 
bounded set and g(x) be a linear function. Then if x°£ X is 
such that g(x°) = max g(x), then x° must be a boundary point 
xeX 
of X. In Problem 1, f(x) = (p - c)x is a linear function 
and X = £xs Ax = b, x = oj is a compact set. Suppose now 
that x° maximizes f(x). Then x° is almost always efficient. 
Figs. 3 and 4 illustrate the theorem for n = 2, m = 2. The 
set X in each case is described by the plane bounded by OAB. 
The enumerated line segments are iso-gross-profit lines. 
They can be viewed as some of the contours of f(x). The 
normals to these lines through the origins indicate, that as 
we go farther (from the origin) into the positive quadrants 
along these normals, f(x) increases. Indeed, the length of 
these normals is proportional to the value of (2.1). In both 
cases it is then clear, that a maximum position cannot be 
reached in an interior point of X. In Fig. 3, the (unique) 
maximizer is x°, and it is clearly efficient. In Fig. 4, 
both x° and x^  are maximizer s and so is every point along the 
line segment between them i.e., any point x such that 
x = tx° +.(1 - t)x1 for te(0,l). Yet out of these, only x° 
29b 
Fig. 3. Efficient solution 
Fig. k. Possibility of a non-efficient solution 
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is efficient. In reality, however, we need not be concerned 
with such situations. First, only x° and x1, out of the 
uncountably infinite solutions, can be obtained by the 
simplex method, for the method considers only vertex solu­
tions. Secondly, as Fig. b portrays, (p^  - Cg) = 0 and 
when we have cases such as this, where (p^  - c^ ) = 0 for 
some i, x^  can always be omitted before the problem is solved. 
Hence, we can generalize and say that Problem 1, if it has 
a solution i.e., if X is non-empty and compact, the solution 
2 
will be efficient.— Thus, condition (a) is satisfied. 
Our second condition is, that while f(x) is at its 
maximum, so are the gross and net profits for every firm in 
the sector. Suppose that there are K such independent firms 
and that ^  = {A Akxk = bk, xk £ Ojcif is the feasible 
set for k = 1,2,... ,K, and let X = SX1*". That is, 
X = fxi x = ^ xk, xk6 XkJ . Also, let f(xk) be the linear 
homogeneous gross profit function of the k-th firm. Then 
we have the following results; 
(a) if max f(x^ ) = f(xk) k = 1,...,K 
xk6Xk 
and x 6 X is such that x = Sx*2 , 
k 
2 
—My analysis here draws heavily on Essary I of Koopmans 
(6) and on Dorfman, Samuel s on and Solow (13), Chap. Î4-, both 
very comprehensive and relatively non-mathematical. 
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then max f(x) = f(x) . 
X € X 
(b) Conversely, if max f(x) = f(x) 
x« X 
and xk are such that 2xk = x , 
k 
then max f(xk) = f(xk) for k = 1,...,K . 
xke Xk 
This is called the decentralization property, and assures us 
that if x^  maximizes the profits for the k-th firm, then 
2xk maximizes profits for the sector and vice versa. Our 
k 
Problem 1, then, does satisfy, theoretically, condition (b) 
•with respect to gross profits. From the operational view 
point, however, it will be, in general, impossible to find 
the x such that x = gx , when solving the problem as formu­
lated. The obstacle is the problem of aggregation. If the 
k A are not identical and the c's are different for the 
different firms i.e., if the firms are not homogeneous, it 
will be impossible to define X and f(x). It may be noticed, 
that even as stated, the above results depend on the profits 
being the same function f for all firms. This is necessitated 
by the particular (which is the most usual) formulation of 
Problem 1.^  Our concern at this point, however, is conceptual 
and we are satisfied that if technical difficulties are elimi­
nated, Problem 1 does possess the decentralization property. 
F^or the more general theorem, see Koopmans (6, p. 12) 
or Koopmans and Bausch (5, p. 81). 
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The third condition requires that net profits he zero at 
their maximum. To see that Problem 1 does satisfy it, 
consider the dual to Problem 1 
to minimize g(u) = bu (2.4) 
subject to A'u = p - c (2.5) 
u Î 0 (2.6) 
The two problems can be treated as a primal-dual combination, 
Problem 2, 
to maximize F(x,u) = f(x) - g(u) (2.7) 
subject to (2.2), (2.3), (2.5) and (2.6). F(x,u) clearly 
represents net profits. If (x°,u°) solves Problem 2, then 
by the duality theorenr- F(x°,u°) = 0. Thus, Problem 1 does 
satisfy the third condition, and it follows that condition 
(b) is also satisfied for net profits. 
Finally, we require that if x° maximizes (2.1) and 
d = d(p) is the system of demand functions for the n 
commodities, with d being the vector of demanded quantities, 
x° = d(p°), where p° is the equilibrium price vector. This 
condition will not be satisfied, unless we are lucky and 
"guess" the right p, p°. If we want to use linear pro­
gramming as a systematic procedure to find the right p, we 
must return to the model presented in Chapter I. Consider 
the primal-dual combination of Problem 3, 
—See, for example, Charnes and Cooper (l4-, pp. 179-182). 
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to maximize G(x,u,w) = d°w - ex - bu. (2.8) 
subject to Ax S b (2.9) 
w - A'u 5 c (2.10) 
- z = - d° (2.11) 
x,u,w ^  0 
First, observe that Problem 3 is equivalent to Problem 2 in 
terms of a competitive equilibrium solution. To see it, 
suppose that (x°,u°,w°) maximize (2.8) over the feasible set, 
and suppose that we are given ex ante that w° = p° is the 
equilibrium price structure. Since 
d° = d(w°) = d(p°) , 
d° is the vector of demanded quantities under equilibrium, 
and we imposed the condition 
x° = d° 
So, Problem 3 can be reformulated as 
maximize (p° - c) x 
subject to (2.9), and 
-A'u = c - p° 
x,u = 0 
which is the same as Problem 2 when p is replaced in (2.7) 
by p°. Hence, a solution to Problem 3, because of its 
identity with a solution to Problem 2 with p = p°, satisfies 
all four basic conditions. The difficulty is, of course, 
operational, as I have indicated above. That is, the 
iterative procedure described in Section D of the previous 
3^  
chapter would be infeasible, both computationally and 
financially, for large scale problems. It is obvious, 
therefore, that we must resort to non-linear programming. 
The task is to develop a model which, under the specified 
assumptions, will yield a solution which will satisfy the 
conditions we have imposed. The major difficulty arises 
from the fact that, unlike linear programming, non-linear 
models will not, in general, have efficient solutions. 
Figs. 5 and 6 depict the relevant situations for n = 2, m = 2. 
In both cases the feasible set is the plane bounded by OAB. 
The elipse-like curves represent the contours of the maxi-
mands, and the arrows denoted by 1 and 2 indicate the iso­
tonic and antitonic parts of the concave maximands, respec­
tively. In Fig. 5, it is clear that the point a, which is 
not efficient, is the maximizer of the objective function 
f(x) over the feasible set X. If we consider only the 
subset of efficient points, EcX, then max^ , f(x) = f(x°) = 
fCx1) = f(x2). But f(x°) < f(a) so that we cannot have 
both efficiency and maximum profits. In Fig. 6, on the 
other hand, x° is the efficient maximizer of the objective 
function over the feasible set, since the point a does not 
belong to this set. If we are to accept a non-linear 
programming model as a framework for solving our problem, 
we must first show that it belongs to the class of models 
represented by Fig. 6. 
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Fig. 5. Non-efficient maximum 
•a 
Fig. 6. Efficient maximum 
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B. The General Form 
The general idea stems from Problem 3 above, which can 
be rewritten as follows: 
to maximize G(x,u,w) = d°w - cx - bu 
subject to 
(2.12) 
0 A 0 
-A' 0 I X 
_0 -I 0 iw 
x,u 
All >
 0 
(2.13) 
The coefficient matrix of (2.13), as is easily seen, is 
skew-symmetric i.e., equals the negative of its transpose. 
That is, the feasible space for Problem 3 is described by a 
5 
self-dual system.— Furthermore, over this feasible space, 
max G(x,u,w) = 0, which means zero net profits. Note also, 
that the coefficients of the linear maximand (2.12) are the 
negatives of the right hand side of (2.13)— 
Abstracting for a moment from economic interpretations 
of the quantities, consider Problem hi 
to maximize cx 
subject to Ax S b 
x ^  0 . 
5 
—See Tucker (15) and Goldman and Tucker (16). 
-See Dantzig (17). 
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We have the following result; 
Lemma 1 Let x° solve Problem b. Thmb = -c and À = -A1 
is a sufficient condition for cx° =0. 
Proof Rewrite Problem 4, using b = -c, as 
max cx 
x éX 
X = fx: Ax 5 -c, x \ oj 
The dual to this problem is 
min -cu 
U É Ï Ï  
U = |u: A'u ^  c, u = oj 
But with A' = -A the dual is 
min -cu 
u dU 
U = {ui Au = -c, u \ 0 J 
which is equivalent to 
min -cx 
x e X 
By the duality theorem 
o o cx = -cx 
which implies 
cx° = 0 . 
The search for a non-linear model which will satisfy our 
conditions, was aimed at finding a model whose structure will 
be as close as possible to that of Problem 3, which, indeed, 
is the case, as will be seen, with the proposed quadratic 
programming model to be presented. 
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In preparation for the presentation, I shall state, 
without proof, Hanson's (18) duality theorem,Z since it is 
essential for the argument. Again, we abstract from 
economic interpretations. Let f: Ip —be convex and 
h: R11 I^ 1 be concave, both functions differentiable 
everywhere. Consider the problem 
min f(x) (2.14) 
x e  X  
X ={XÎ h(x) = b, x = 0.} 
Then, by Hanson's theorem, the problem 
max g(u,v)=f (u) - u'af (u) - v1 [h(u) - 3h(u)*u] (2.15) 
v eV(x) 
V(x) ="^ vî dh(u)*v - 3f(u) = 0, v ^  o] 
is such that 
f(x°) = min f(x) = max g(u,v) = g(u°,v°) (2.16) 
xe X v eV(x) 
and u° = x° (2.17) 
The framework of the model to be discussed is exactly 
the same as that of Problem 3. That is, all the usual 
Q 
assumptions of activity analysis— hold. In addition, we 
assume: 
(a) The supply functions for "unrestricted" inputs are 
perfectly elastic, so that prices of these inputs can be 
considered as given and constant. 
S^ee also Dorn (19). 
o 
—For a rigorous treatment, see Koopmans (7). 
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(b) The demand structure is given by the system 
d = d° + Dp (2.18) 
where D is negative semi-definite, d° being a vector of 
constants. 
The first assumption is not essential. I chose to 
impose it at this point for simplicity. It will be relaxed 
later. 
The second assumption is essential, as will be seen 
later. Some elaboration on it seems desirable because of 
its economic implications. By negative semidefiniteness is 
meant, that for any y ^  0 we must have yDy <0. As far as 
I can see, the restriction on D cannot be clearly interpreted 
in economic terms, even though it is economically meaningful. 
According to Newman (20), it seems that the minimum restric­
tions on the elements of D, which are necessary to assure 
its negative semidefiniteness are, that all the diagonal 
q 
elements of D be negative-*- and that D be strongly quasi-
diagonalized. The second restriction is the one which does 
not lend itself to a clear interpretation. It means, that 
there must exist a vector w > 0 such that 
i = (2.19) 
and 
E^conomically, this means exclusion of Giffen goods. 
4o 
(2.20) 
where d.- are the elements of D. w- those of w and the ij 1 l 
vertical bars indicate absolute values. A special case 
occurs when (2.18) and (2.19) hold for w = 1. Then D is 
strongly diagonalized which means, in economic terms, that 
the effect of p^  on d^  (the i-th element of d) is stronger 
than both the sum effects of all other prices on d^ , and the 
sum effects of p^  on all other commodities. All that is 
required by our restriction is w > 0, and hence we can say 
only, that there must exist at least one linear combination 
of the price effects such that p^  affects d^  more than does 
this linear combination, when applied both to all other 
prices in relation to d^ , and p^  in relation to all other 
commodities. 
Another question is, whether or not negative semi­
definiteness is actually met in reality or not. Again, there 
seems to be no basis for an a priori answer. The only, and 
very weak ground, for expecting D to be negative semidefinite 
(or negative definite), is related to the so called Hicksian 
stability conditions.— This can be shown as follows: let 
the supply structure be represented by 
1 = 1° + Lp (2.21) 
i^ See, for instance, Allen (21, pp. 325-329)• 
kl 
where 1 is the n-vector of supplied quantities, 1° a vector 
and L a matrix of constants. Let p be such that 
1° + Lp = d° + Dp , 
and define the excess demand vector 
e = d - 1 . 
Now, let there be an initial disturbance which causes p to 
deviate from p and let the adjustment process be described by 
p = Ke = K(d° - 1°) + K(D - L)p 
A 
where K is a diagonal matrix of constants, representing the 
speed of adjustment, and p is the time derivative of p. The 
Hicksian conditions show, that if p is to be stable i.e., if 
after the initial disturbance p —> p, (D - L) must be 
negative definite. Now, if D is negative semidefinite, and 
L is positive definite, then (D - L) is negative definite. 
Thus, if there is a reason to believe that p is stable and 
that L is definite, then D is negative semidef inite. How­
ever, expecting stability does not imply that D is negative 
semidefinite, since for h > 0 
h(D - L)h < 0 hDh < 0 and hLh > 0 . 
Finally, to test D for negative semidefiniteness, one 
investigates the signs of the principal minors of (D + D'). 
If these have the sign (-l)x for i = 1,2,...,n, then (D + D*) 
is negative semidefinite and so is D. This can be shown 
as follows: 
h(D + D')h < 0 ==> hDh + hD'h <"0. Now, hD'h = (hD'h)5 , 
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since hD'h is a scalar. Hence, 
hDh + (hD'h) • = 2hDh < 0 => hDh < 0 . 
We are now prepared to present the general form of the 
quadratic programming problem, called Problem I.l; 
The resemblance to Problem 3 can be seen immediately, 
if we rewrite the system (2.23) through (2.25) as 
and realize that the coefficients of the linear part of 
(2.22) are the negatives of the right hand^ side of (2.26). 
We can also see now why assumption (b) is essential. It 
assures us of the concavity of (2.22), which, in turn, is 
required to assure that a maximum position will be a global 
one. 
Our task now is to show that a solution to Problem I.l, 
if one exists, satisfies our conditions for efficiency and 
competitive equilibrium. 
We first consider the dual to Problem I.l, which by 
Hanson's theorem is Problem 1.2; 
to maximize F1(x,p,u) = d°p + pDp -cx - bu 
subject to Ax - b S 0 
(2.22) 
(2.23) 
(2.24) 
(2.25) 
p - A'u - c = 0 
d° + Dp - x S 0 
x,p,u = 0 
(2.26) 
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to minimize G(z,w,y,v) = -d°y - zDz + cw + bv (2.27) 
subject to -Aw + b ^  0 (2.28) 
(2.29) 
(2.30) 
-y + A'v + c 0 
-d° - Dz - D' (z - y) + w ^  0 
w,y,v ^  0 
The vector z here represents that part of the vector u in 
Hanson's theorem, whose elements enter the dual objective 
function (2.15) with non-zero coefficients; v, w and y are 
the dual variables. 
Theorem 1 If Problem I.l has a solution (x, p, w), 
then F^ (x, p, u) = 0 
Proof First, rewrite (2.22) as 
F1(x,p,u)= -[(-d°-Dp+x)1p] - [(-p+A'u+c)'x] - [(-Ax+b)'u] (2.31) 
Each of the three terms in (2.31) is an inner product of 
vectors which are restricted to be'non-negative. Hence, over 
the feasible set for Problem I.l, 
From the Kuhn-Tucker (22) necessary and sufficient conditions 
we have, if we let (z,w,y,v) solve Problem 1.2, 
-[(-d°-Dp+x)'y] - [(-p+A'u+c)'w] - [(-Ax+b)'v] = 0, (2.33) 
since each of the three inner products of (2.33) vanishes. 
From (2.31), (2.32) and (2.33), x = w, p = y and u = v is 
a solution for Problem I.l if it is feasible. For feasi­
bility, we must have 
F1(x,p,u) S 0 (2.32) 
-Aw+b = 0, -y+A'v+c = 0 and -d°-Dy+w = 0. 
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But with z = p by (2.17) and with p = y, these are precisely 
the dual conditions, which are satisfied by (w,y,v). Hence, 
x = w, p = y and u = v, and F (x, p, u) = 0 = PL (x, p, u). 
- o n 
Corollary Whenever p. > 0, x< = éL» + 2 dn- n- p^  i.e., 
l j=l 
p^  equates the supply and demand for the i-th commodity. 
The corollary follows immediately from the first term in 
(2.33), since y = p. 
Theorem 2 If Problem I.l has a solution (x, p, u), 
then x is efficient i.e., is a boundary point of the set 
X - fx: Ax = bj 
Proof Consider the linear programming problem 
to maximize F^ (x, p, u) 
subject to Ax = b 
-A'u S -p + c 
-x 1 -dQ - Dp 
x, u > 0 
Clearly, this problem and Problem I.l have the same solution 
in x and u. Since p > 0 because of non-saturation, we can 
rewrite the linear problem using the corollary, as Problem 
1.3: 
to maximize f^ (x,u) =(p - c)x- bu= F^ (x,p,u) (2.34) 
subject to Ax S b (2.35) 
-A'u = -p + c (2.36) 
x,u t 0 
Suppose now that x is not efficient i.e., Ax < b. Then 
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from the third term in (2.33), since v = u, 
5 = 0  ( 2 . 3 7 )  
(2.36) and (2.37) imply p - c 1 0. The case p - c = O is 
trivial, since thœf^ Xjïï) = 0 for all x. If p - c < 0, then 
x > 0 (x = 0 is, again, trivial) implies 
fl(x,u) = 3^ (x,p,u) < 0 
which contradicts Theorem 1. Hence, û > 0 and x is efficient. 
Corollary The solution to Problem I.l possesses the 
decentralization property, if p is universal. 
This follows immediately from the fact that Problem I.3, 
whose solution in x is the same as for Problem I.l, is a 
self-dual linear programming problem. Its primal constituent 
is 
to maximize (p - c)x 
subject to Ax S b 
2 = 0 ,  
whose solution has been shown to satisfy decentralization. 
The two theorems and their corollaries show, that the 
solution to problem I.l satisfies all the desired conditions. 
That is, the solution is a competitive equilibrium. However, 
as has been already mentioned, the empirical results which 
can be obtained in the framework of Problem I.l are of 
limited usefulness, for two reasons: first, there is, of 
course, the aggregation problem, which prevents us from 
formulating a representative technology matrix. Secondly, 
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whether the model is applied to the entire economy or to an 
isolated sector, no information with regard to intersectoral 
allocation of resources can be obtained. The pattern of 
allocation is determined a priori, once b is determined, 
since no intersectoral movement of resources, such as labor, 
is allowed for in the model. The same is true with regard to 
information concerning firms: their optimal size and number. 
For these reasons, it is desirable to reformulate the 
problem so as to make possible the derivation of results 
regarding interindustry and interfirm relationships. The 
next sections are devoted to this task. Models, having the 
same basic characteristics, will be constructed to allow 
flows of resources and/or final goods between any predeter­
mined production units (firms, regions etc.). 
C. Trade in Input Factors 
In order to simplify terminology, I shall define a 
"producer" as a production unit representing a firm, indus­
try, region or some aggregate thereof. This is done in 
order to avoid in each case the necessity of spelling out the 
exact variant of each model that can be applied to a particu­
lar production unit. In most cases it will be self evident 
and where not, I shall give the necessary specification. 
We introduce a superscript k to discriminate between the 
producers, where always k = 1,2,...,K. The notation 
b? 
introduced in Section A holds throughout, additional notation 
being defined when warranted. 
We conceive of a market for the limited resources. Each 
potential producer, possessing no initial stock of these 
resources, can purchase non-negative amounts of each of the 
resources, the total purchases being limited by the availa­
bility of these resources. It is worthwhile to point out, 
that this device enables us to determine the optimal size of 
each producer, and the number of producers actually engaged 
in production. This is, particularly with respect to the 
agricultural sector, of utmost importance, as has been 
pointed out in Chapter I. 
The following additional vectors are defined: 
s^  = the purchases of the limited factors made by the 
k-th producer; 
t^  = the given per unit transaction costs involved in 
these purchases; 
u = the imputed factor prices of the k-th producer; 
u = the "market" prices of the resources. 
It should be noted, that even though u is obtained as an 
imputed price, it can be thought of as a market price, since 
k it will be determined by the intersection of 2s and b, the 
demand and perfectly inelastic supply functions for the 
Tr 
resources, t can accommodate a spatial setup, as it may 
include transportation costs from the market to the producer. 
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In addition to the above, we define the aggregates 
x = gsk and s = 2sk. Also, 
X E (z1, x2,...,xK)' 
U = (u1, ii2,... ) ' 
S = (s1, s2,...,sK)' 
Problem II.1 now is as follows: 
maximize 
F2(X,p,U,u,S) = d°p + pDp - gAf - bu - 2tksk (2.38) 
k k v < 
subject to Ax - s =0 (2.39) 
s = b (2.40) 
p - Ak'uk S ck (2.41) 
Dp - x 5 - d° (2.42) 
uk - u i tk (2.43) 
X,p,U,u,S — 0, k — 1, 2,...,K. 
The only restriction which deserves further interpretation, 
is (2.43). It can be recognized at once as the condition for 
equilibrium in trade. It requires that producer k purchase 
resources only up to the point where their value to him is 
equal to the costs of acquiring them. 
A theorem equivalent to Theorem 1 could be proven here 
in exactly the same fashion. Instead, it would be useful to 
show, as a heuristic argument, that Problem II.1 has precisely 
the same structure as Problem 1.1. Denoting by 1^  and Im 
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the n and m-dimensional identity matrices, and choosing for 
convenience K = 2, the coefficient matrix for Problem II.1 is 
0 0 -A1' 0 0 0 0 In 
0 0 0 -A2' 0 0 0 In 
A1 0 0 0 
-Im 0 0 0 
0 A2 0 0 0 
-Im 0 0 
0 0 \ 0 0 0 -Im 0 
0 0 0 Im 0 0 -Im 0 
0 0 0 0 Im 0 0 
_In -In 0 0 0 0 0 D 
(2.44) 
It is immediately seen that (2.44) has exactly the same 
structure as the matrix in (2.26). This common structure 
seems to be a sufficient condition for the validity of 
Theorem 1. This can be seen when.we recognize, that (2.31) 
is the corner stone of the proof of this theorem. For 
(abstracting again from any economic interpretation) consider 
the following problem: 
+ X2DX2 to maximize (-b 0) 
subject to 
(2.45) 
(2.46) 
x = (x1 x2) ' = 0 
The problem has exactly the same general structure as 
Problem 1.1. We now multiply (2.46) by x, an operation 
similar to the one which yielded (2.31). We get: 
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i t  , 2  1  2» i o  o  
-x Ax - bx + x Ax + x Dx > 0 
which is equivalent to (2.32), and requires (2.4-5) to be 
non-negative for all feasible x. 
This demonstration of the connection between the 
structure of the problem and Theorem 1 may be taken formally 
as an equivalent to Lemma 1 in the case of quadratic pro­
gramming. It makes clear that a theorem similar to Theorem 1 
can be proved for Problem II. 1. This being the case, we can 
conclude that a solution to Problem II.1 does satisfy 
conditions (c) and (d), and that part of condition (a) 
relative to the "economy" as a whole. We still have to show 
that the solution is decentralized and efficient. 
We start out by assuming that Problem II.1 has a solu­
tion (X, p, U, u, S) and that the competitively behaving 
producers face the prices (p, u). Then the profit maximiza­
tion problem for the k-th producer is Problem II.2: 
to maximize gk(xk,uk,sk) = (p - ck)x^ - (u+tk) sk (2.47) 
subject to Akxk - sk S 0 (2.48) 
-Ak'uk = - (p - ck) (2.49) 
uk 1 (u + tk) (2.50) 
x^  uk, sk ^  0 
for k = 1, 2,...,K. It is seen immediately, that II.2 is 
a self-dual linear programming problem to which Lemma 1 
applies. Thus, if (x§, uk, sk) solves it, 
gk(^ , uk, sk) = 0 (2.51) 
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It is also obvious, because of the primal-dual structure of 
the problem, that the solution is efficient for each producer. 
Hence, the argument will be completed once we show 2xk = x, 
2sk = s and Un = U. k 0 ° 
For this, consider the linear programming Problem II.3 
to maximize F2(X, p, U, ïï, S) (2.52) 
subject to (3.2), (3.3) and 
-x 1 - d° - Dp (2.53) 
-Ak'uk 1 - (p - ck) (2.54) 
uk 5 (u + tk) (2.55) 
X, TJ, S = 0, k = 1, 2,...,K. 
Clearly, Problems II.1 and II.3 have the same solution in 
(X, U, S) and hence, over the feasible set, (2.52) is zero 
at maximum. 
Theorem 3 If (X, p, ïï, û, S) solves Problem II.1 and 
(Xq, uk, sk) solve Problem II.2 for k = 1, 2,...,K, then 
X = XQ, Û = U0 and S = SQ. 
Proof From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions and Theorem 1 
(when properly applied to Problem II.1), we have for Problem 
II.3 
(P-Ak uk-ck)Hk = (Akik-Ïk)ûk = (nk-tk-5)f = 0 (2.56) 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for Problem II.2 read 
(p-Ak'uk-ck)xk = (A q^-S U^q = (uQ-Tk-u) Sq = 0 (2.57) 
(2.56) and (2.57), being the same, and constituting, together 
with the _-elevant constraints, the necessary and sufficient 
52 
conditions for Problems II.2 and II.3, lead to the required 
result, since Problem 1.1 has the same solution in (X, U, S) 
as Problem II.3. 
This completes the demonstration that the solution to 
Problem II. 1 will comply with our imposed conditions. Note 
also, that the third inner product in (2.56) implies that if 
sk > 0, uk - u = tk and when u^  - u < t\ sk = 0. This means, 
that the condition for spatial equilibrium is also satisfied. 
Clearly, Model II.1 does present a formulation which is 
applicable to the problems of intersectoral and interregional 
allocation. Unlike Problem 3 above, a solution to Problem 
II.1 will determine the efficiency frontier for each producer 
and guarantee an efficient production pattern. That is, we 
have here a way of solving not only for the optimal alloca­
tion of resources among products, but also among production 
units. Considering the U.S. agricultural sector, we have a 
way to determine not only the optimal commitment of resources 
(particularly labor) to the sector as a whole, but also the 
optimal size of farms under competitive equilibrium. As I 
have pointed out in Chapter I, these are, indeed, the basic 
problems facing American agriculture. In addition, in a 
situation where maintaining the family farm structure is 
deemed desirable,— it will be possible to determine whether 
—See (1, p. 12). 
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or not such an aspiration can be defended on economic grounds. 
It is to be noted, that the formulation of Problem II.1 
is flexible, in the sense that it can allow for the inclusion 
of immobile resources, and for initial quantities of mobile 
resources at the disposal of producers. In some cases, where 
spatial effects are important, such initial possessions may-
render the model more realistic. A less atomistic breakdown 
would be to conceive of a number of spatially separated 
markets for resources, a number smaller than the number of 
potential producers. This would be a typical regional setup. 
Considering the case where each potential producer has 
an initial quantity of mobile resources, and letting K = 2, 
1 ? denote by s resource shipments from the first to the second 
21 producer and by s the reverse shipments. Assuming that per 
unit transportation rates are the same in both directions, 
and denoting these by t, Problem II.1 is reformulated as 
to maximize d°p+pDp~c^ x^ ~c2x2-b^ I~b2u2-t( s^ +s2^  
subject to 
0 0 -A1' 0 0 0 In x1 c1 
0 0 0 -A2' 0 0 In x2 c2 
A1 0 0 0 Im -Im 0 ul bl 
0 A2 0 0 -Im Im 0 u2 < b2 
0 0 
-Im Im 0 0 0 s12 t 
0 0 Im -Im 0 0 0 s21 t 
-In -In 0 0 0 0 D p o - v. • 
J •  .. — — 
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This reformulation has exactly the same structure as II.1, 
and it can be verified that all that has been said with 
regard to II.1 applies here as well. The advantage of II.1 
over the reformulation, concerns the size of the problem. 
The problems are of equal size only if K = 2. Otherwise, 
II.1 is smaller, by K - 2. (By size is meant the number 
of constraints, which is the same as the number of variables.) 
D. Further Extensions 
This section is devoted to a brief presentation of more 
applicable variations of Model 1.1. In each case I shall 
present the model, point out its main advantages, assuming 
always that, since the structure of all these models is 
similar to 1.1, their solutions always satisfy the conditions 
for efficiency and competitive equilibrium"! That this is 
indeed the case, can be verified in each case by proving 
theorems equivalent to Theorems 1, 2 and 3. 
We start out by introducing a spatial element to the 
commodity market. We conceive of L spatially separated 
markets for final goods, the demand system in each of which 
is given by 
d = dy + dV" 1 = 1,2,...,! (2.58) 
where d^  is a vector of constants. No special restrictions 
must be imposed on D^ , since it can be thought of as given by 
D^ " = a-jD a^  € (0,1), Za-^  = 1 (2.59) 
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where a^  is a scalar. That is, we can think of as 
obtained from D on a population basis. In other words, a^  
is that portion of the total population which constitutes 
the 1-th market. Then, since D is negative semidefinite, so 
is 1)1. We assume, to avoid the necessity of using too many 
superscripts, that in each consumption region there are K 
producers. The transportation costs within each consumption 
region are neglected, primarily for convenience, s^ l and t^ l 
denote the shipments and per unit transportation costs from 
consumption region j to region 1, respectively. We assume 
tjl = tlj* for 1, j = 1, 2,...,L. ~Problem III.l then is 
to maximize 2[ (dJ+p^ Jp^ Sc^ x^ -Sb^ u1511]- 22t31sjl (2.60) 
1 k k 
subject to A^ x^ l 1 b^  (2.61) 
pi _ Akl»ukl g ckl (2.62) 
D1?1 + 2 (slj - sjl) - 2x^ " S - d1 (2.63) 
k ° 
p1 - p3 < (2.64) 
pj - pi < = tjl (2.65) 
x^ l, pi, u^ l, s^ l > 0, k = 1, 2,...,K. (2.66) 
It is worthwhile to point out, that (2.64) and (2.65) 
do not contradict each other. That is, the intersection of 
the sets defined by (2.64) and (2.65) is not empty. Fig. 7 
depicts this intersection for L = 2, when restricted to the 
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12 
Fig. 7. The transportation restrictions 
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positive orthant, given by the shaded area. When s12 > 0, 
the point (p^ , Pg) will be somewhere along the line 
pi = -t12 + p2 and if s21 > 0, along the line p* = t12 + p2. 
•I p Q1 
If s-L<1 = s = 0, (p1? Pg) will be somewhere between these 
lines. 
It should be understood, that a spatial setup of 
resource markets could be incorporated as well. I have not 
done so only for convenience. That is, Problems II.1 and 
III.l can be combined into one problem. When this combina­
tion is used, the solution would indicate the following 
optimal patterns: 
1. the allocation of resources among producers, and hence 
the optimal number of producers and their size; 
2. the optimal rates of outputs of each commodity by each 
producer; 
3. the optimal trade pattern in both resources and final 
goods. 
It - should be pointed out, that III.l is, in a sense, a 
wasteful formulation. This results from the fact, that at 
the most half of the s^  will assume non-zero values. This 
also means, that at the most half of the restrictions in 
(2.64) and (2.65) will become effective. I have not found 
a way to improve on this point, primarily because of the 
restrictions (2.66). Otherwise, one could define s^  = -s^  
and cut the restrictions by half. 
58 
We are now ready to dispense with assumption (a), 
postulated in Section B. It will be recalled, that this 
assumption stipulated that prices of "variable" inputs are 
fixed and given. I have also mentioned, that convenience was 
the main underlying reason. However, regarding empirical 
studies, we find almost invariably that the assumption is 
also made because of lack of reliable estimates of supply 
functions for such variable inputs. The following model is 
suggested for cases where such estimates are available. 
We assume that the supply structure for the said inputs 
is given by 
r = r° + Hz (2.67) 
where r is the vector of supplied quantities of the Q 
variable inputs, r° is a vector of constants, z is the vector 
of prices and R is a positive semidefinite matrix. The 
restriction on R is exactly equivalent to that on D. Thus, 
for instance, R must have positive diagonal elements. 
We expand the technology matrix A, by introducing a 
matrix B whose elements are the input-output coefficients 
relating x to r. Problem III.2 then is 
to maximize d°p + pDp - r°z - zRz - bu (2.68) 
subject to Ax S b (2.69) 
Bx - Rz Î r° (2.70) 
p - A'u - B'z = 0 (2.71) 
Dp - x 1 - d° (2.72) 
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X,  p ,  TIj  Z  =  0  
Since both D and (-R) are negative semidefinite, (4.11) 
is a concave function. The coefficient matrix 
0 -A' -B' I 
A 0 0 0 
B 0 -R 0 
-I 0 0 D 
of the constraint set for Problem III.2, is seen to have, 
indeed, the same structure as in the previous cases. Model 
* 
III.2 can be used in any combination with Models II.1 and 
III.l. Moreover, one could also introduce a spatial setup in 
the variable inputs market. When it is realized that (2.70) 
stands in the same relation to the input market as does 
(2.72) to the output market, we have here a model which will 
determine also the input market equilibrium prices. That is, 
the model allows for all possible variations, except for 
variations in the technical magnitudes. The model is, 
indeed, very general, a fact which can be recognized more 
fully by realizing that it is, in fact, a reformulation of 
12 the Walras-Cassel general equilibrium model.— It is a 
reformulation in two respects: first, it is explicitly 
presented as a constrained maximum problem. Secondly, it 
12 
—See, for instance, Dorfman, Samuelson and Solow 
(13, PP. 352-353). The systems (13-1), (13-2), (13-3) and 
(13-4) there, are equivalent to our (2.70), (2.18), (2.71) 
and (2.67), respectively. 
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specifies the functional form of the demand and supply-
relations. This specification is actually something more 
than formal, since it also specifies 
3d = 3r = o 
t>Z 3p 
Another step in the direction of a completely generalized 
competitive equilibrium model is the introduction of inter­
mediate commodities. That is, we may have a situation, where 
some, or all, of the inputs which in III.2 are supposed to be 
purchased, are actually produced within the "economy" under 
consideration. 
To facilitate such a situation, we redefine our com­
modity space. Let a point in the commodity space be denoted 
by y. Then y can be partitioned as 
y = 
yd 
yint yd< 0> yPr > 0> ymt > Q (2.73) 
ypr 
where yd is a point in the subspace of desired commodities 
(final goods), y"*"13^  a point in the subspace of intermediate 
goods and yPr a point in the subspace of primary commodities 
(resources). An activity is now defined as a vector in the 
commodity space, describing a production process. Such a 
vector has negative entries for commodities emerging as 
outputs from the process, positive entries for commodities 
going as inputs into the process, and zero entries for 
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commodities not involved in the process. When A is so 
redefined, we can partition it in accordance with (2.73) to 
obtain 
X ~ 
A = Aiat (2.74) 
•^ pr 
where it is clear that Ad < 0, A^  >0. We also denote by 
w the imputed prices of the intermediate commodities; x 
denotes the level of use of the activities. 
With these notations, Problem III.3 is formulated as 
follows: 
to maximize G(x, p, u, w) = d°p + pDp - bu 
subject to A&x + Dp S -d° 
A int x S 0 
V  x  = 1  
-Ad'P "AÎ^ w^ - A^ _u I 0 pr 
(2.75) 
(2.76) 
(2.77) 
(2.78) 
(2.79) 
p, u, w ç 0 
Model III.3 can actually be looked upon as combining 
Koopmans' (7) linear production model with Walras' concep­
tion of the market, in a quadratic programming formulation. 
It should then suffice to remark, that III.3 can be combined 
with II.1, III.l and III.2, in order to bring to bare the 
extent of the generality of the model. 
I should like to demonstrate the fact that (2.75) is, 
indeed, the profit function, even though it does not contain 
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the costs of non-primary inputs. First, we have again the 
formalistic assurance that Theorems 1 and 2 are satisfied by 
III.3? when we look at the coefficient matrix of the con­
straint set 
0 
-4r 
V 0 
A-int 0 
A, 0 
-A 
0 
0 
0 
int -K 
o 
0 
D 
(2.80) 
which is of the same familiar form. Thus, if (x, p, u, w) 
solves Problem III.3, 
G(x, p, u, w) = 0 (2.81) 
Next, we have, using (2.73), (2.74), and (2.76) to 
(2.78), 
yLa^ Dp1 
o -int 
rAd ' 
int A 
ÀPT 
- < 
x -
/ 
(2.82) 
From Koopmans (7, pp. 63, 82, 89) we know that part of 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for efficient 
production is 
(P wu) V  \ 
V pr 
= o 
/ 
To avoid the necessity of introducing additional notation, 
(2.83) 
2à 
-^ Gee Koopmans (7, p. 82). 
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suppose that in (2.82) strict equality holds. Then from 
(2.82) and (2.83), 
-d°p -pDp + wyi2rt + ub = 0 (2.84) 
But (2.8l) and (2.84) imply 
wy^  = 0 (2.85) 
which means, that the net costs of intermediate commodities 
are zero, hence (2.75) is, indeed, the profit function. 
(2.76) is, again, the requirement for non-positive excess 
demand, (2.79) requires that no activity yield positive 
profits, and (2.77) requires that no intermediate commodity 
will have a net negative output. Again, (2.79) constitutes 
part of the necessary and sufficient conditions for efficient 
14 production.— It can be verified that the rest of these 
conditions are also satisfied. 
E. Conclusion 
As stated, the objective of this chapter was to devise 
tools which will enable us to follow the recommendations of 
Chapter I. That is, we had to provide the necessary means to 
carry out the process of formulating a choice. This objec­
tive was achieved for at least certain situations, namely 
those which meet the assumptions underlying the above models. 
True, these assumptions impose restrictions which, at least 
l4 
—See Koopmans, op. cit. 
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for the producing sector of the economy, are economically 
meaningful. Yet it seems to me, that for all practical 
purposes, these restrictions are not hindering. This is to 
say, such restrictions will not lead to "wrong" choices. 
Even if the economy under consideration does not meet exactly 
the assumptions of activity analysis and linear demand 
structure^ the quantitative errors will not lead to qualita­
tive changes. This is particularly true when one takes into 
account the imperfections of the statistical methods, 
usually used to estimate the necessary parameters and 
technical coefficients. 
Apart from the more limited task of providing a feasible 
framework for empirical studies, it is very likely that the 
results of this chapter provide the opportunity for proving 
some competitive equilibrium existence theorems. Even though 
these would not be as general as some of the heretofore 
15 
established theorems—*•, they would have the advantage of 
being sensitive to empirical verification. Such existence 
theorems would be derived from the conditions under which the 
various models have a solution. These conditions are that 
the constraint set in each case be non-empty convex and 
compact. One would then have to investigate the economic 
S^ee, cf. Arrow and Debreu (23), Debreu (24, pp. 
83-88) and Gale (25). 
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implications (if any) of these conditions. However, this 
falls beyond the scope of this study. 
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III. APPLICATION 
A. The General Setting 
The application as carried out for the purpose of this 
study, should not be considered as more than a first step 
illustrative example, convincing though it may be. As in 
most other instances, beginnings are modest, and ours is no 
exception. The restricted scope of our application is due 
largely to the fact that computational techniques and 
facilities, as well as the availability of data, are still, 
very much a restricting factor. It might be added, however, 
that more elaborate applications will be possible in the not 
too distant future. 
Keeping the_notâtion of Chapter II, the model applied is 
the simplest possible, namely 
to maximize f(x,p,u) = -ex -bu + dp + pDp 
subject to -A'u + p = c 
Ax S b 
-x + Dp = -d 
x, p, u £ 0. 
The Economy" considered is a sub-sector of agriculture, 
consisting of the following products: 
1. Wheat, corn, oats and barley for food. 
2. Feed grains, consisting of a mixture of corn, oats, 
barley and grain sorghum. 
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3. Soybeans and cottonseed oil meals. 
4. Cotton lint. 
The production set consisted, thus, of seven production 
activities: wheat, corn oats, barley, feed grains, soybeans 
and cotton. 
This composition of the production set already presents 
a major difficulty, in that none of the products considered 
can be regarded as being strictly a final commodity. In 
particular, feed grains and oil meals are typical intermedi­
ate commodities, no portion of which is used for final con­
sumption. The reason why this presents a difficulty is, that 
usually no demand functions for intermediate commodities are 
estimated, especially if such goods are durable, as are feed 
grains and oil meals. At best, estimations for intermediate 
demand functions are derived from the relevant final demands 
by employing some assumptions. Estimates obtained in this 
manner are not only questionable from the statistical point 
of view (biasedness, consistency, etc.) but, because of the 
assumptions employed, tend to affect the so derived price 
elasticities by an unknown percentage. For instance, a 
demand function for feed grains may be derived from demand 
functions for livestock products. However, to accomplish 
this, one would have to assume pre-determined fixed propor­
tions between the various feeds, which will, no doubt, affect 
the obtained estimates for slope or elasticity coefficients. 
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Such difficulties do not arise if one is allowed to 
place products such as feed grains in their proper category. 
To do this, one would have to include all the livestock 
products and all types of feed in the model, using demand 
functions for the livestock products. The production and 
utilization of the intermediate goods, as well as their 
prices, will then be determined "within" the model, since the 
demand for these commodities will be generated on the basis 
of what is called for to facilitate the production of the 
final products. 
Another difficulty arising from the treatment of inter­
mediates as final goods occurs in cases of joint production. 
This can be illustrated by the example of cotton. Two of the 
products forthcoming from cotton are cotton lint and cotton­
seed oil meals. Demand functions will be used, say, for 
lint and oil meals, supply of oil meals coming also from 
soybeans. The ratio between lint and cottonseed oil meals is 
fixed. Then, depending on the coefficients of the demand 
functions, a situation may arise in which no combination of 
cotton and soybeans production exists which will equate the 
supply and demand for cotton lint and oilmeals simultaneously. 
As in the previous instance, had we treated oilmeals as an 
intermediate commodity, the difficulty could not have arisen. 
The correct classification of the commodities involved 
was not possible for two reasons. First, a substantial 
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amount of refinement in the data related to the livestock 
industry is needed before such data can be included in a 
sensitive model as ours. A tremendous effort concerning the 
livestock industry by Brokken (11), does provide a solid 
basis on which to proceed, but there is still a lot to be 
desired. Second, the inclusion of livestock products in the 
model at this stage, would have increased the size of the 
problem (in terms of the number of variables) beyond what can 
be presently handled by available computer programs which, as 
pointed out before, are still a limiting factor. 
I have thus far discussed what has not been done and the 
underlying reasons. It is worthwhile to stress, however, 
that what has been done was not merely a forced choice. 
There are very good reasons for choosing the above crops even 
if there were no limiting factors. First of all, the crops 
chosen occupy the bulk of the intensively cultivated acreage 
which is devoted to field crops. That is, a sizeable portion 
of the agricultural economy is represented by the crops 
chosen. Secondly, part of the products included, are the 
ones which are considered to constitute a considerable part 
of what is referred to as the "farm problem". By that is 
meant primarily wheat, feed grains and cotton, which are 
produced in great "surpluses". In view of our analysis in 
the first chapter, it is of major interest to find out what 
would happen to these crops under competitive equilibrium. 
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That is, what would "be the prices if the market were to be 
cleared. Third, there is the consideration of the reliability 
of the data. As pointed out in Chapter II, some very sub­
stantial studies were carried out, which treated the same 
group of commodities. Each of these studies, beginning with 
Heady and Egbert (8), involved a careful and very sophisti­
cated assemblence of data. The result is a collection of 
data which probably presents the best that can be done in 
gathering information. Applying our type of model to such 
refined data is very likely to produce reasonable results, 
as, indeed, is the case. 
These, then, are the positive and negative reasons 
which dictated the particular application attempted in this 
study. 
B. The Data 
Two are the major sources of data, both presenting 
them in a very detailed fashion. Hence, only a few comments 
will be needed here, the interested reader being referred 
to the sources. 
On the supply side, the data used in this study are 
based solely on Skold (9) and "Whittlesey (10). Both these 
works contain a collection of input-output and cost coeffi­
cients, land constraints and rotational weights for 144 
regions of the U.S., projected to 1975 and 1965, respectively. 
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The data used here are 1965 projections, and the reference 
to Skold is made because some of the data are listed in more 
detail in his study.— The projections were made on the basis 
of time-argumented linear regressions. The sources of the 
crude data are listed in the bibliography list of the two 
mentioned studies, and I find it therefore superfluous to 
repeat them here. The rotational weights refer to feed 
grains. That is, it is assumed that out of every acre 
devoted to feed grains in a given region, a certain pre­
determined percentage will be under each of the four com­
ponents of feed grains, including the possibility of 0% for 
some of them. Another way to do it would be to formulate 
explicitly constraints on rotation. This, however, would 
have increased substantially the size of the problems, and 
hence was not tried. For the purpose of our study, there 
is no meaning to talking about rotation restrictions on a 
non-regional basis, hence a predetermined composition of feed 
grains was assumed. 
The actual input-output data for the present study were 
obtained by aggregating the regional data. Admittedly, the 
aggregation problem is one of the toughest in applied 
economics. It is not a theoretical problem, at least not 
within the realm of activity analysis. Theoretically, the 
-See Skold (9), Tables 12, 13, lb, 16, 65, 68 and 71. 
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aggregate production possibility set is the vector sum of 
2 the individual production possibility sets.— There is no way 
yet, however, to practically compute such an aggregated 
opportunity set. Any individual set, can be represented 
(spanned) by a finite number of meaningful activities (e.g. 
wheat, corn etc.). What is involved in aggregation would be 
to find the same type of meaningful activities spanning the 
aggregate possible cone. Specifically, given n possible 
cones representing n producers, each of these cones being 
spanned, say, by two activities labled "wheat" and "corn", 
what are the "wheat" and "corn" activities spanning the 
aggregate possible cone? No practical answer is available, 
and the only way open to the researcher at this point, is 
the use of common sense i.e., the exercise of prejudice. 
This is, to a great extent, the procedure used here. 
The regional input-output coefficients were aggregated by 
way of using acreages as weights. These weights were a 
mixture of available regional acreages and the regional 
planted acreages as given in the various solutions of Skold. 
The resulting coefficients were then checked by comparing the 
total productive capacity under these coefficients with that 
under the regional coefficients. 
A few words should be said concerning the place of labor 
•^ Seja_Koopmans (6, pp. 9-10). 
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in the model. As pointed out in the first chapter, the 
portion of the labor force allocated to agriculture is 
probably one of the major, if not the major, factor in the 
U.S. farm problem. Coping with this problem would,therefore, 
require a very careful and explicit treatment of labor. 
What would be called for, is an explicit formulation of labor 
constraints and labor input-output coefficients, thereby 
facilitating the determination of the total labor power 
required to produce the emerging bill of goods, and the 
resulting reward to labor. The lack of this feature in the 
present study is one of the prime reasons for cautioning 
against regarding it as much more than an example. 
As in other instances, the reason for omitting labor 
as an explicit factor in the model is the lack of data. As 
is well known, the gathering of reliable data concerning 
availability of labor is extremely difficult, particularly 
in agriculture, where a considerable portion of the labor 
force is not occupied consistently in farming. Some labor is 
hired periodically, especially in the major harvesting periods. 
Even some of the people living on farms engage in part time 
work outside their farms, either in other farms or in non-
agricultural occupations. Some of the labor is supplied by 
part time work of farm youth, and the "availability" of such 
labor cannot virtually be determined. The task of gathering 
information on labor availability in the farm sector, is 
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therefore a study in its own right, and could not be attempted 
for the purpose of our application. 
The data for the consumer side of the market are taken 
almost entirely from Brandow (26). Only a few figures 
concerning foreign trade in livestock products were taken 
from statistical reports of the U.S.D.A. (27, 28). The basic 
procedure was as follows: the farm level linear demand 
functions, derived from the estimates of logarithmic-linear 
retail level demand functions, were taken as a basis.— A set 
of prices was then assumed for all the relevant commodities 
not in the model. These prices, assumed to remain at their 
1955-57 means, were inserted into the included demand 
functions, thereby adjusting the intercepts (constant terms). 
The demand functions were then adjusted to reflect the 1965 
per capita income, and population. The adjustment to per 
capita income was done by giving the appropriate values to 
the trend variables, whose coefficients were estimated by 
Brandow. Figures for the 1955-57 population were obtained 
from the U.S. Statistical Abstract (29). The latest popula­
tion estimates available were then taken from Current 
Population Reports (30). The average annual population 
increase was then assumed to remain unchanged and used to 
project the 1965 population, a projection which yielded 
—The process of derivation is described in Brandow. 
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approximately 193 >690,000. The ratio of this projection to 
the 1955-57 average was used to adjust the demand functions. 
Finally, demands were adjusted to foreign trade. The export 
figures for grains were taken from Skold, while the foreign 
trade data for livestock products were obtained from the 
above mentioned statistical reports (27, 28). These were 
used to adjust the relevant constant terms of the demand 
functions. The major assumption here is, that average grain 
exports of recent years (including those under Public Law 
4-8O) will remain unchanged in 1965. 
A few words ought to be said with regard to the demand 
functions for feed grains and oil meals. It is, so it seems 
to me, very reasonable to believe, that in the short run, say 
within a time span of a year, the quantity demanded of feed 
grains is virtually independent of their price. The reason 
is, that any appreciable adjustments in the purchase of feed 
grains can be brought about only by adjustments in the 
number of livestock fed, and these are unlikely to take place 
in the short run. However, even if the above does not hold, 
there is certainly a considerable gap between short run and 
long run elasticities. Such differences exist in general, 
for any good, but are undoubtedly larger in cases such as 
if 
ours.*~ Which demand function should one choose? 
4. 
-See e.g. Stigler (31, pp. 4-5-46). 
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As stated before, such a problem -would not have occurred 
had we treated feed grains and oil meals as intermediate 
commodities. However, in our case a choice had to be made. 
The demand functions for feed grains and oil meals are based 
5 
on those given in Table 16 of Brandow. These are supposed 
to represent the long-run elasticities when prices are 
expressed as price indeces. These estimates were used only 
as a guideline. They could not be used without impairing 
the consistency of the model. The reason is, that the demand 
functions for livestock products are not included in the 
study. This being the case, prices of livestock products 
had to be assumed in advance as given, in order to adjust the 
demand functions for consumer products that are included in 
the model. But once the prices of livestock products are 
considered as fixed, so are the demanded quantities of these 
products. Hence, one cannot use, under these circumstances, 
long run demand functions for feeds. The result is, that we 
were virtually forced to use arbitrary coefficients for the 
demand functions for feed grains and oil meals. There is not 
much to be said in defense of the particular coefficients 
chosen from the theoretical standpoint. However, some 
consolation may be found in the fact that changing these 
coefficients over a considerable range would not have altered 
5 
—How they were derived is explained in Brandow, pp. 
75-79. 
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the equilibrium prices. The reason for this is demonstrated 
in Fig. 8. 
Let Q, P and C denote the quantity, price and costs of 
feed grains, respectively. Let S be the supply function, 
drawn after solutions for all other commodities in the model 
have been obtained and are kept constant. Then q^ qy is the 
maximum quantity that can be produced after the required land 
has been allocated to all other commodities. Let D, D' and 
D" be three demand functions for feed grains, having a common 
intercept d and different slopes. As can be seen from the 
diagram, the price per unit of feed grains under equilibrium 
"will be equal to the costs per unit unless the demand func­
tion intersects the supply function above the line segment 
P = C. This occurs in the case of D". Then P = C + U, 
where U is the imputed value of a unit of land. That is, 
P > C only if U > 0, which can happen only if the available 
land is exhausted. 
Suppose now that D1 represents the function actually 
used in the model. Then the question is whether or not, by 
changing the coefficients, we could have reached a situation 
like the one represented by D". That is: by how much do we 
have to decrease the slope of D', in order to bring about the 
exhaustion of the land available to feed grains? 
The answer is that no such negative slope exists. The 
reason is, that under the actual solution, d < q#ax" The 
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. 8. Illustration of demand and supply functions 
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opposite possibility, of increasing the slope of D', does~not 
affect the price as long as there exists a point of inter­
section between the supply and demand curves. An increase 
large enough to prevent such intersection, is clearly of no 
economic interest. The net result is, that we could have let 
the slope of D1 vary from 0 to any reasonably large slope ~" 
(say -2) without affecting equilibrium prices. The same 
holds true with regard to oil meals. 
Table 1 displays the simplex tableau in its entirety. 
x. for j = 1, 2,...,7 are production activities; u. for 
J 3 
j = 1, 2, 3 are imputed values in dollars per acre; p^  for 
j = 1, 2,...,7 are prices in dollars per ton. As for the 
column P0 (usually referred to as "the right hand side"), 
c^  for i = 1, 2,...,7 are production costs in dollars per 
ton; b^  for i = 1, 2, 3 are the different types of available 
land in tens of thousands of acres; d^  for i = 1, 2,...,7 
are the intercepts of the demand functions, in tens of 
thousands of tons. The land input coefficients are in acres 
per ton. As can be seen, the ratio of cottonseed oil meals 
to cotton lint is taken to be .777 ton per ton. The elements 
of the lower right diagonal block are the slope coefficients 
of the demand functions. There are three groups distinguish­
able in that block; 
1. food grains; 
2. feed grains and oil meals; 
Table 1. The simplex tableau 
Item Wheat Corn Oats Barley FG— 
X-, x2 X, 
Sb^  Cotton Total Sb 
Xz Xm land land 
U1 u2 
Wheat 
Corn % 26.53 23.57 
Oats 
Barley % 18.47 23.73 
FG 
Sb °4 
25.83 
38.42 
Cotton 
Total land % 363 24546 1.33 .558 1.39 1.21 .785 1.548 3.8 
Sb land 
Cotton land % 6634.9 1689.6 1.548 3.8 
Wheat 
Corn 
-2859.2 -1 
-867.61 -1 
Oats 
Barley 
-132.32 -1 
-18.167 -1 
FG 
OM 
-d* 
-% 
-14000 
-1600 
-l 
-1 
- .777 
Cotton 
"
d7 
-463.66 -1 
-^ ":558 
-1.39 
-1.21 
- .785 
-1.5^ 8 -1.548 
-3.8 
a 
""Feed grains. 
-Soybeans. 
/ 
Table 1. (Continued) 
Item Cotton Wheat Corn Oats Barley FG OMS. Cotton 
land P! P2 P3 PI* P5 P^  P7 
u3 
Wheat 
Corn =2 
1 
1 
Oats 
Barley % 1 1 
FG 
Sb 
1 
1 
Cotton 
Total land % -3.8 .777 1 
Sb land 
Cotton land 
• % 
Wheat 
Corn 
-.6077 .05313 
.0532 . -.51898 
.00864 
.004113 
.0013225 
Oats 
Barley 
.008632 .0040923 
.0013953 
-.1666 
-.018754 
FG 
OM -dg 
-.233 .052 
.016 -.1 
Cotton -dy -.20969 
O^il meals. 
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3. cotton lint. 
The cross price elasticities between these three groups are 
assumed to be zero. The zero elements within the first group 
are not zero by assumption, but the coefficients which would 
have appeared there were so small that they were ignored. 
Any and all additional explanations regarding the data 
can be found in the sources from which they were derived, and 
we shall therefore proceed to present and discuss the 
solution. 
C. The Solution 
In order to solve the quadratic programming problem, a 
computer program based on the Hartley-Hocking (32) algorithm 
for convex programming was used. The algorithm itself is 
based on successive implicit linear approximations to the 
non-linear functions in the system. Each non-linear function 
is approximated by a sequence of linear segments, thus 
converting the convex into a linear programming problem. The 
key feature of the algorithm is, that the linear approxima­
tions are not actually computed in advance. Instead, the 
"best" (most profitable) approximation is automatically 
chosen at each iteration and, using the product form of the 
inverse, computed for only one function at a time. 
I would like to make clear at the outset, that the fact 
that the problem as presented had a solution at all, is 
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merely a coincidence. As mentioned in the first section of 
this chapter, the equations relating to oil meals and cotton 
lint need not have a solution at all. They will not have a 
solution as soon as the slope coefficients in the demand 
function for oil meals are sufficiently changed. An infeasi-
bility of this nature can be also brought about by changing 
c^  and Cy (Table 1), d$ and dy, or the slope of the demand 
function for cotton lint. All this is pointed out in order 
to make clear that the existence of a solution in our 
particular case, cannot be regarded as a proof for the 
validity of the formulation given in Table 1. 
In Table 2, all the information derivable from the 
solution is presented. There is not much to be said about 
the quantities produced. Since the price elasticities for 
all products are small around the mean values, it could be 
expected that the x• will be more or less close to the 
corresponding d^ , which is, indeed, what happened. There 
is more to be said about the prices. 
As could be expected, the prices in the optimal solution 
are in most cases considerably lower than current market 
prices. In fact, since the values of land in all three land 
categories are zero, the demand functions for all the 
products intersect the corresponding supply functions at a 
point where P = C (see Fig. 8). Hence, unless the cost 
figures contain an "adequate" return for labor, competitive 
84 
Table 2.' The solution 
Land use 
000 acres 
• Production 
unit 000 units 
Prices 
S/unit 
Wheat 37832.1 bu 948163.9 .796 
Corn 4781.3 bu 306019.0 .660 
Oats 1801.0 bu 80981.3 .230 
Barley 214.9 bu 7399.9 .570 
FG 109868.4 ton 139959.8 25.830 
Sb 20053.6 — — — — —  —  —  —  —  
Cotton 14726.5 ton 3875.4 363.000 
OM ton 15965.7 38.420 
Unused land: 
total 56182.2 —  —  —  
Sb 46295.4 — — — 
Cotton 2169.5 — — — 
production under the current conditions in agriculture cannot 
provide the farmer with a satisfactory level of income. This 
is not surprising at all, and was pointed out in the first 
chapter as a distinct possibility. However, the results are 
still to be treated with caution, because of the oversimpli­
fied formulation of the problem. It is very possible that, 
once a multiregional setup is considered, land values will 
not be zero in all regions, resulting in higher prices for 
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the products. It is impossible to speculate by how much this 
would change the prices in the present solution, but it still 
seems reasonable that any such change would not be sufficient 
to void some of the basic conclusions. 
In order to see how some of these conclusions can be 
drawn, I choose to treat in detail the two major productss 
wheat and feed grains. 
Suppose, that all prices and quantities except those of 
wheat remain constant at their solution level, and that the 
government imposes a minimum price of $1 per bushel of wheat. 
Even if this would not have changed production, buying the 
surplus wheat at the minimum price would have costed the 
government about 1.7 million dollars. This could not be 
considered an expense under Public Law 480, since all types 
of foreign aid are included in the demand function for 
wheat. To the mentioned expense one would then have to add 
shipment and storage expenses and overhead associated with 
storage capacity and administration. 
Clearly, production would not have remained unchanged. 
In fact, for any price higher than $.796 per bushel one 
would have to expect that a good deal of the unused land 
would be drawn into wheat production. To speculate how much 
additional land would be planted with wheat is difficult, 
since this depends on regional technology. For purpose of 
illustration, suppose that the boost of 29$ in the price of 
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wheat would have "brought about a similar increase in the 
wheat acreage. That would have added another 11 million 
acres of wheat. To prevent such change, the government would 
have to pay the difference between the price and the costs of 
a bushel of wheat, which is 20 cents. This would mean about 
another 56 million dollars in the form of a land retirement 
program. I think, that these simple calculations demonstrate 
very clearly the advantage to be gained from applications 
such as this one. As pointed out in our introductory 
discussion, consideration of a large number of alternatives 
In an explicit form is likely to improve the process of 
choice. The opportunity to do so is granted by our applica­
tion, as the above calculations demonstrate. 
Turning now to the case of feed grains, I would like to 
show first that any reasonable change in the slope coeffi­
cients of the demand function for feed grains would not have 
changed their price. As before, we suppose now that the 
outputs of all products other than feed grains are fixed 
at their solution level. As demonstrated in Fig. 8, the 
price of feed grains could have changed only if u^  > 0 
(see Table 1). To bring this situation about, the remainder 
of "total land" would have to be planted with feed grains. 
If this were done, the total output of feed grains would have 
been about 21 million tons, which is greater than d^  by 5 
million tons. 
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Calculations similar to those carried out for wheat can 
be performed with regard to feed grains. Taking as a basis, 
for instance, the 1955-57 average situation, total produc­
tion of feed grains was about 124 million tons at a price of 
about $44 per ton."" This is a price which is higher than the 
solution price by about $14 per ton. If this price were to 
be maintained without any change in production, the costs of 
buying surpluses would have amounted to over 2.5 million 
dollars. Again, this is, of course, only a fraction of what 
the total expenses would have been. 
Finally, a word is to be said about cotton and soybeans. 
Cotton is the only product which, within the framework of 
this application, carries what can be termed as "pure 
profits". This is again a result of the fact that oil meals 
are not treated as an intermediate commodity. We thus have a 
situation where the costs per ton of cotton lint are $363, 
but revenue is about $393, because the income from a ton of 
lint is $363 and there is an additional income of about $30 
for the meals that emerge as a byproduct of lint. The same 
situation would have occurred with regard to soybeans, had we 
included the demand functions for oils in the model. From 
the theoretical viewpoint, the solution cannot, therefore, be 
regarded strictly as a competitive equilibrium, since there 
—Derived from data in TJSDA statistics (33, 34). 
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is some income not accounted for by expenses or rent. The 
only way to eliminate this difficulty, as well as the ones 
mentioned above, is to consider the various products in their 
proper categories. 
D. Outline for a Proposed Application 
As stated at the outset, the above application is of 
mere demonstrative value. It therefore seems desirable, in 
order to eliminate the possible impression of disproportion 
between theory and practice, to describe in detail a proposed 
application, to be carried out at Iowa State University in 
the near future. 
The research will be executed in two stages. At first, 
the crops considered will be the same as in the above example. 
In the second stage, the field crops and livestock industries 
will be integrated in a single model. In both stages, the 
model used will be III.l (see p. 55) ? where the K producers 
will be K (where K will be approximately 40) production 
regions. The number of consumption regions, L, will be 
about 10. 
Suppose, then, that Model III.l is applied, and that it 
yields the following competitive solution: 
p1 = p1; x^ 1 = x^ "; d1 = ïï1 . (3.1) 
Since the vectors b^  are most probably, as was observed in 
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Chapter I, not part of a price guided allocation, it is most 
reasonable to expect that the solution (3.1) will not be 
considered acceptable from the point of view of, say, farm 
income. In other words, since average profits 
2 2 b^  ukl / K (3.2) 
1 k 
or some individual terms b^ u^  thereof will be "too small", 
some public intervention will be desired. We shall now see 
how a "farm program" can be obtained by using the results 
of (3.1). 
Assuming that (3.2) is, indeed, below the desired 
minimum level, a price support system is called for. Suppose 
that the support prices are determined at p^ . Then there 
are three major possibilities: 
(a) all prices are changed by the same factor in all 
consumption regions. That is, 
Poi / = mo for a11 i j; 
(b) the price for any given commodity is changed by 
the same factor in all regions i.e., 
poi / Pi = mi for a11 3; 
(c) prices are arbitrarily changed. Essentially, the 
alternative to be chosen will depend on the profit pattern 
associated with the solution to III.l, and on the supply 
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level which the policymaker wishes to maintain. The latter 
will be based on what is considered to be "adequate" from the 
consumer's standpoint. It is easy to see that whereas (a) 
may not affect the level of production (and possibly not 
even profits) at all, (b) will preserve the interregional 
trade pattern i.e., relative distribution of every commodity 
between the consumption regions will be the same as in III.l, 
since the p^  's will satisfy (2.64) and (2.65) as do the p^  's 
for all consumption regions j. Alternative (c) may bring 
about a total change. 
Since alternative (c) is the most general, we shall 
choose it for the continuation of the present outline. The 
reader will be readily able to see what simplifications can 
be made if (a) or (b) are chosen. It should be noted, that 
the choice of a general alternative is not a sufficient 
basis for the anticipation of a particular direction of 
change from the solution to III.l. As a matter of fact, even 
when the relation between p and p£ is exactly known, 
different directions of change are still possible, depending 
on the structures of and A^ . In order to be able to 
complete the description of the scheme, we will assume: 
i — i 1. Pq > p for all j in such a way that 
do + dJ'po - ^  for all 3. 
2. A supply level of at least d*1 is to be maintained in 
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all regions j. 
As a first step, we shall now find the effect on profits 
and supply that the price support system, under Assumptions 1 
and 2, exerts. This will be done by solving Problem A: 
to maximize 2(p^  - Zc^ )x^  - 2 St^ s^ l 
j ° k i^ j 
subject to A^ x1^  5 bk^  
2xkl + Z(slj - sil) ^  d1 (3.3) 
k Vj 
If (3*3) is not binding, the solution to Problem A will be a 
competitive equilibrium among the regions under the price 
regime p£. In that case trade will also be at an equilibrium. 
If, however, (3.3) is binding for some 1, the solution will 
merely be efficient. If the latter is the case, we face a 
difficult practical problem, since some administrative action 
is needed to secure the desired supply for those regions and 
commodities for which (3.3) is binding. The only other 
possibility is to change the prices in those regions. We 
shall therefore impose 
3. PQ are determined in such a way that (3.3) is not 
binding. 
Under this additional assumption, (3.3) is needed merely to 
solve for the new trade pattern. 
We again find ourselves at a junction point. The avenue 
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along which the investigation will proceed depends totally 
on the actual solution to Problem A and its relation to that 
of Problem III.l. First, the effect of the support system 
on profits in any one region cannot be anticipated. Second, 
we have to know exactly what the demanded quantities under 
PQ will be. Thirdly, we cannot anticipate the direction that 
the change in regional production may take. We shall there­
fore add assumptions as necessary to continue the presenta­
tion. 
kl il Suppose that the solution to Problem A is (xQ , s^  ) and 
define r^  to be the regional supply vectors associated with 
this solution. Further, let 
1o = a0 + 
be the regional demand vector under p^ . We add the following 
assumptions: 
4. qjj 5 d3* for all j. 
5. Farm income as given by the solution to Problem A is 
deemed "satisfactory". 
i —i 
Since by Assumption 3 r* > d , it implies, together with 
Assumption 4, the existence of surpluses. The actual 
surpluses, if the consumers pay p^ , are (r^  - q^ ). However, 
j 
we want the consumers to have d . The first step is, there­
fore , to fix "consumer's prices" at p*1. Once this is done, 
we face two problems: regional surpluses of (r^  - d^ ) and 
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price gaps of (p3 - p3*). 
o 
There are three courses of action that can be taken in 
dealing with these problemsi 
(a) pay the farmers the difference p^  - p^  for the 
quantities d^  and purchase the entire surpluses (r^  - d^ ) at 
Poi 
(b) pay the farmers the difference as in (a), but 
eliminate the surpluses through acreage control measures, 
with or without compensating the farmers; 
(c) using a combination of (a) and (b). As for the 
price gap, there is no way other than paying the farmer the 
difference of p^  - pJ* for the quantity d^ . The three methods 
differ, therefore, in the approach to the surplus problem. 
Our task becomes now to provide the information necessary 
for evaluating the alternatives in welfare terms. 
For alternative (a), we compute 
g  =  2  p - t i  -  à 3 ) .  
3 0 
The total public expenditures associated with (a) will be 
given by 
g  +  2 (pf  -  p 3 )  d j  (3»  j  °  
It should be noted, that (a) does not involve any form of 
central planning, which may be very important in making the 
final policy choice. 
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As for alternative (b), we mentioned already that it may 
be implemented by law. This would be the purest form of 
government control and, keeping in line with the assumptions 
of Chapter I, we shall rule such a procedure out. The 
second method of implementation is a "land retirement program" 
which does not compel the farmer to subject himself to the 
central planning. The major difficulty it presents, as is 
well known from past and present experience, arises from the 
fact that the number of farmers participating in the program 
is not known in advance. This would lead us automatically 
to alternative (c). However, to complete the argument we 
shall pretend that the program will be fully effective. In 
order to realize its implications, we solve Problem B, 
to minimize 2 2 ck3xk5 +22 t31s31 
j k l*j 
subject to k^j^ kj < %kj 
2xkl + 2 (s1^  - sJ*1) = d1 (3.5) 
k lj*j 
The solution to Problem B will yield the most efficient 
interregional production pattern which will secure the supply 
_1 —1 
of d , the equilibrium quantity under p . It is worthwhile 
to note, that Model B is the same as the one used by Heady 
et al. (8, 9, 10, 11), which reinforces our claim in Chapter 
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Ij that it is a tool for finding the most efficient way of 
executing a particular policy, and is in line with the general 
prescribed process of choice. It is also worth mentioning 
i -i that since by Assumption 3 > d', the solution to Problem 
-B is not efficient, which reflects the element of central 
planning present in the land retirement scheme. This fact 
might play an important role when alternatives (a) and (b) 
are compared. 
Based on the solutions to Problems A and B, we can now 
compute the payments that must be made to the farmers in order 
to bring about the necessary reduction in acreage. Using p^ , 
we compute the regional profits resulting in Model B and 
subtract them from those of Problem A. The difference is 
divided by the difference of regional acreages between the 
two solutions, and a system of payments per acre is thus 
established. This will be done, of course, for each crop 
separately. 
Alternative (c) is comprised, of course, of an infinity 
of possibilities. We shall test a few by selecting some q^  
such that 
qj > q3* > dj for all j. 
o — - __ 
The quantity vectors q^  will be evenly spaced in the relevant 
interval, each serving to resolve Problem B upon its substi­
tution for dJ in (3.5). In each of these cases, regional 
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surpluses of (q*1 - d*5") will have to be purchased, and the 
surpluses (r^  - q^ ) eliminated through acreage reduction. 
The actual number of q*1 tried will depend on the pattern of 
change emerging from trying the first few. 
The results obtained in the entire process, when repeated 
for various price support systems, will enable the policy­
maker to select the to him most acceptable policy, having 
considered the most efficient way of implementing each of the 
possible policies. This is precisely the method of choice 
recommended in Chapter I. 
In concluding this section, it should be noted that, 
once sufficient data on farm labor are available, one could 
also consider the various policies on the grounds of farm 
population and returns to labor. It will also be very 
interesting to evaluate at that stage various policies of 
public support to agricultural research and education. In 
general, it will ultimately be possible to introduce any 
aspect which one may wish to consider. 
B. Conclusion 
We started out with a welfare analysis concerning the 
U.S. farm problem, which resulted in a suggested scheme of 
going about the choice of a farm policy. A series of models 
was then developed which make it possible to follow that 
scheme under various economic structures (regions etc.). 
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We proceeded to present a very limited application which 
demonstrated the working of one of the models. Finally, we 
presented an outline of an elaborate application, to be 
carried out in the near future. 
There is still a long way to go before empirical results 
will be obtained that will be solid enough to serve as a 
basis for actual policy recommendations. In order to achieve 
such results, data have to be refined and the formulation of 
the model has to reflect reality in every possible way. 
Because of the aggregation problem, a regional approach is 
strongly recommended. Since man power in agriculture is 
probably a crucial ingredient in the farm problem, an 
attempt must be made to formulate labor restrictions. When 
satisfactory data concerning labor are available, the models 
can be used to determine the optimal farm size by regions, 
thereby contributing significantly towards the analysis of 
another important component of the farm problem. 
What this study set out to do, is to propose methodologi­
cal as well as technical improvements in dealing with_the 
farm problem. These two rather ambitious goals were, so I 
hope, at least partially achieved. 
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